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Why would governments use seignorage to finance their deficits, knowing that continued money 
creation ultimately leads to inflation? Under normal conditions developed countries rarely use 
seignorage. … Heavy reliance on seignorage usually occurs in war-torn or developing countries, in 
which military or social conditions dictate levels of government spending well above what the country 
can raise in taxes or borrow from the public (Note 1). 
[W]ith a profligate fiscal policy, it is impossible for a monetary authority to sustain low inflation 
because the inter-temporal government budget then implies that the monetary authority must sooner or 
later impose a sufficiently large inflation tax to finance the budget (Note 2). 
 
Abstract 
Here I review the history of debt monetization by the Federal Reserve, as well as the relationship 
between debt monetization and inflation. While it is commonly held that inflation follows from debt 
monetization, that has not been the case in the U.S., at least not since the Korean War. From the early 
1950s through 2007 debt monetization has been modest and steady, while inflation has been highly 
variable. With the recent financial crisis, debt monetization entered a new era. Since 2008 the 
magnitude and composition of debt monetization has no precedent. Also unprecedented is the Federal 
Reserve’s ability to suppress inflation despite extensive debt monetization, at least through 2015. 
Overall, since the creation of the Federal Reserve, the United States has experienced substantial 
inflation both with and (more commonly) without debt monetization. It remains to be seen if the United 
States can experience substantial debt monetization without inflation. 
Keywords 
seignorage, debt monetization, inflation, financial crisis 
 
1. Introduction 
Seignorage is an ancient word, originally referring to the exclusive power of the sovereign to coin 
money. Later, seignorage came to indicate the revenue derived from that power. In a modern economy 
seignorage occurs when the central bank buys—“monetizes”—government debt. Seignorage, or debt 
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monetization, has other names: inflation tax, printing money, and, most recently, quantitative easing. 
Whatever the terminology, when the Federal Reserve buys U.S. Treasury debt, it becomes a source of 
federal revenue. 
Here I examine the history of debt monetization by the Federal Reserve since it came into existence in 
1914. I also examine the relationship between debt monetization and inflation. While it is commonly 
held that inflation follows from debt monetization, that has not been the case in the U.S., at least not 
since the Korean War. Since the early 1950s (through 2007) debt monetization has been modest and 
steady, while inflation has been highly variable. 
The rate of debt monetization changed dramatically with the recent financial crisis. Indeed, starting in 
2008 the magnitude and composition of debt monetization has no precedent in the Federal Reserve’s 
history. Another unprecedented outcome is the ability of the Federal Reserve to suppress inflation 
despite extensive debt monetization, at least through 2015. 
This overview suggests three distinct periods in the history of U.S. debt monetization: a conventional 
debt-monetization-with-inflation era, encompassing World War II and the Korean War; the 
inflation-without-debt-monetization era, encompassing most of the years between the Korean War and 
the financial crisis; and the debt-monetization-without-inflation (so far) era starting with the financial 
crisis. Overall, the historical review presented here indicates, contrary to conventional wisdom, that 
debt monetization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for subsequent inflation to occur. 
 
2. Debt Monetization 
By law the Federal Reserve is not allowed to buy bonds directly from the Treasury. The Federal 
Reserve can deal directly with the Treasury only to trade the Federal Reserve’s mature bonds for an 
equivalent value of new bonds. Beyond that the Federal Reserve must buy or sell bonds in the 
secondary market. The Federal Reserve generally refinances (rolls over) all of its maturing debt and 
returns the interest payments it receives—net of operating expenses—back to the Treasury (Note 3). 
What does the history of debt monetization look like? Let Ft represent the Federal Reserve holdings of 
government debt at time t. Net purchases by the Federal Reserve between successive periods can be 
written as: 
 
It is informative to measure debt monetization relative to national income (N), 
 
By that measure and with time intervals of one year, the history of debt monetization by the Federal 
Reserve since 1915, when it first started purchasing U.S. Treasury debt, is depicted in Figure 1 (Note 
4).  
Over its entire history the average value of debt monetization is .4 percent of GDP per year. Debt 
monetization exceeded 1 percent of GDP for one year during the Great Depression (1932), for three 
years during World War II (1943-1945), for one year during the Korean War (1951), and in four of the 
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last seven years (2009, 2011, 2013, and 2014). Debt “de-monetization”, when the Federal Reserve is a 
net seller of bonds, also occurs. The Federal Reserve de-monetized debt in 21 years in its history, 
although the amounts have tended to be minor. Debt de-monetization fell below negative 1 percent of 
GDP only in 2008. 
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Figure 1: Debt Monetization, 1915 -- 2015
Change in Federal Reserve Holdings of U.S. Treasury Debt, Relative to GDP
 
Figure 1. Debt Monetization, 1915-2015 
 
3. Inflation 
Standard macroeconomic theory indicates that, under fairly broad conditions, inflation (π) will be 
related to debt monetization relative to the money supply (M): 
 
where  represents the relationship between inflation and  (Note 5). Along with the 
preceding equation, the simple quantity theory of money (Mv = N) implies that: 
 
Where v is the velocity of money and N is national income (Note 6). This function represents the 
conventional view that inflation should be, at least in part, a function of the ratio of Federal Reserve 
purchases to national income. 
The history of debt monetization and inflation in the U.S. since 1940, shown in Figure 2, calls the 
stability of that function into question (Note 7). While debt monetization at times is correlated with or 
precedes inflation (see 1943 through 1951, even with the price controls of the 1940s), debt 
monetization is neither a necessary condition (see 1968 through 1982) nor a sufficient condition (see 
2009 through 2015) for contemporaneous or subsequent inflation to occur. 
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Figure 2: Debt Monetization and Inflation
1940 -- 2015
Debt Monetization Inflation
 
Figure 2. Debt Monetization and Inflation, 1940-2015 
 
From that perspective the more than half-century from 1952 through 2007 is noteworthy. In that period 
the rate of debt monetization was small and steady, with an average value of .3 percent of GDP. In 
contrast, over the same period inflation has not only been high, but highly variable as well, exceeding 4 
percent for fifteen successive years, 1968 through 1982, and exceeding 8 percent in four of those years. 
The ascent and descent of inflation throughout this period is an important chapter in American 
economic history, but that history is unrelated to debt monetization (Note 8). 
Table 1 summarizes the debt monetization and inflation rates across the various periods discussed 
above. 
 
Table 1. Selected Periods 
Period Number of Years 
Average Rate of Debt 
Monetization 
Average Rate of Inflation 
1915-2015 101 0.4% 2.9% 
1943-1951 9 1.0% 5.0% 
1952-2007 56 0.3% 3.4% 
1968-1982 15 0.3% 6.4% 
2009-2015 7 1.8% 1.4% 
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4. Debt Monetization and the Financial Crisis 
The Federal Reserve’s response to the recent financial crisis has no precedent. In 2008 the Federal 
Reserve engineered the largest debt de-monetization in its history, selling about $300 billion in U.S. 
Treasury securities. Federal Reserve sales amounted to more than 2 percent of GDP in that year. This 
de-monetization was more than offset, however, by the purchase of private debt from banks and 
non-bank institutions alike. Thus, it appears that the Federal Reserve was selling federal debt in order 
to offset its purchases of private debt (Note 9). That desire for neutrality did not persist. Between the 
end of 2008 and the end of 2014, the Federal Reserve set post-World War II records for debt 
monetization, purchasing about $1.6 trillion in Treasury securities, averaging about 2 percent of GDP 
per year over the five years.  
But something else changed as well. In 2008 the Federal Reserve began buying the obligations of 
so-called Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). These GSE obligations are referred to in the 
Federal Reserve balance sheet as “agency securities” and “mortgage-backed securities”. Agency 
securities are conventional bonds issued by the following GSEs: the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the 
Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS) (Note 10). Mortgage-backed securities are those issued by 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and another GSE, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie 
Mae). Federal Reserve holdings of the various types of federal obligations since 2008 are displayed in 
Figure 3. Table 2 summarizes these values by year. 
 
$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
$3,000
$3,500
$4,000
$4,500
$5,000
Ja
n
-0
7
A
p
r-
0
7
Ju
l-
0
7
O
ct
-0
7
Ja
n
-0
8
A
p
r-
0
8
Ju
l-
0
8
O
ct
-0
8
Ja
n
-0
9
A
p
r-
0
9
Ju
l-
0
9
O
ct
-0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
A
p
r-
1
0
Ju
l-
1
0
O
ct
-1
0
Ja
n
-1
1
A
p
r-
1
1
Ju
l-
1
1
O
ct
-1
1
Ja
n
-1
2
A
p
r-
1
2
Ju
l-
1
2
O
ct
-1
2
Ja
n
-1
3
A
p
r-
1
3
Ju
l-
1
3
O
ct
-1
3
Ja
n
-1
4
A
p
r-
1
4
Ju
l-
1
4
O
ct
-1
4
Ja
n
-1
5
A
p
r-
1
5
Ju
l-
1
5
O
ct
-1
5
Billion $
Figure 3: Federal Reserve Holdings of Treasury and GSE Securities
2007 -- 2015
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Figure 3. Federal Reserve Holdings of Treasury and GSE Securities, 2007-2015 
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Table 2. Federal Reserve Holdings of Treasury and GSE Debt, 2007-2015 
 
$ Billions Share of Total 
End of 
Fiscal 
Year 
U.S. 
Treasury 
Securities 
GSE Agency 
Securities 
GSE 
Mortgage-Backed 
Securities 
Total 
U.S. 
Treasury 
Securities 
GSE 
Agency 
Securities 
GSE 
Mortgage-Backed 
Securities 
2007 $779.6 $0.0 $0.0 $779.6 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2008 $476.6 $3.7 $0.0 $480.3 99.2% 0.8% 0.0% 
2009 $766.1 $130.1 $692.2 $1,588.4 48.2% 8.2% 43.6% 
2010 $808.9 $154.1 $1,086.2 $2,049.2 39.5% 7.5% 53.0% 
2011 $1,663.6 $108.3 $875.7 $2,647.5 62.8% 4.1% 33.1% 
2012 $1,643.2 $84.8 $847.9 $2,575.8 63.8% 3.3% 32.9% 
2013 $2,056.8 $63.7 $1,349.9 $3,470.4 59.3% 1.8% 38.9% 
2014 $2,447.1 $40.0 $1,708.1 $4,195.2 58.3% 1.0% 40.7% 
2015 $2,461.9 $35.1 $1,742.9 $4,239.9 58.1% 0.8% 41.1% 
 
The federal guarantee of the obligations of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHLBS used to be described 
as implicit (Ginnie Mae’s obligations have always had an explicit guarantee); but with the federal 
takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac it became clear that the U.S. Treasury intends to honor all of 
the GSE obligations (Note 11). 
If one views these GSE obligations as federal debt, the implications are dramatic. Table 3 shows the 
rate of debt monetization—the change in Federal Reserve holdings relative to GDP—based on its 
acquisition of both Treasury Securities and GSE securities. 
 
Table 3. Debt Monetization Relative to GDP, 2007-2015 
End of Fiscal Year Treasury Debt Monetization / GDP 
Treasury + GSE Debt Monetization 
/ GDP 
2007 0.1% 0.1% 
2008 -2.1% -2.0% 
2009 2.0% 7.7% 
2010 0.3% 3.1% 
2011 5.5% 3.9% 
2012 -0.1% -0.4% 
2013 2.5% 5.4% 
2014 2.2% 4.2% 
2015 0.1% 0.2% 
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Recall that the highest level of debt monetization prior to the financial crisis occurred in 1944 at 3.5 
percent of GDP. Considering both Treasury and GSE debt, for the six years 2009-2014 the average rate 
of debt monetization was 3.9 percent of GDP—about ten times the historical average to that point. Debt 
monetization exceeded the World War II peak in four of those six years, with a maximum rate of 7.7 
percent in 2009. Another way to appreciate these magnitudes is to note that by the end of 2007 the 
Federal Reserve over its entire history had acquired on net $780 billion of nominal federal debt. Over 
the next seven years, it would acquire an additional $3.5 trillion, more than four times as much as in the 
previous 92 years. 
 
5. Excess Reserves and Suppressed Inflation 
Despite this unprecedented debt monetization, inflation has remained low, averaging 1.50 percent over 
the eight years from 2008 through 2015. Many economists have observed that the broader money 
supply remains uninflated because of the unprecedented buildup of excess reserves—the deposits of 
banks with the Federal Reserve in excess of their reserve requirements (Note 12). Excess reserves had 
been negligible until 2008. They increased from less than $2 billion at the beginning of 2007 to a peak 
of about $2.7 trillion by September 2014. That $2.7 trillion is about 80 percent of the $3.4 trillion of 
debt monetization over the same period. Figure 4 shows the history of bank reserves over the last eight 
years. 
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Figure 4: Required Reserves, Excess Reserves, and Total Reserves
2007-- 2015
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Figure 4. Required Reserves, Excess Reserves, and Total Reserves, 2007-2015 
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This build-up of excess reserves followed from the newly-introduced policy of paying interest on those 
reserves, at about the same rate as short-term treasury bills. The Federal Reserve had not been allowed 
to pay interest on reserves, until that restriction was lifted by the passage of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 (Note 13). 
So, while the Federal Reserve is printing money, the banks are keeping most of that money on deposit 
with the Federal Reserve. Another unprecedented outcome: while annual inflation rates have averaged 
1.50 percent over the last eight years, one-year Treasury bill rates have averaged .44 percent. Since the 
financial crisis, the U.S. government has been borrowing money, at least short-term, at negative real 
rates of interest. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Several observations follow from this review of the history of debt monetization in the United States: 
● Debt monetization, resulting in substantial inflation, played a role in financing World War II and 
the Korean War. This might be described as the conventional era in the history of U.S. debt 
monetization. 
● From the early 1950s through the end of 2007, debt monetization served as a steady and minor 
source of federal revenue, accounting for less than 1/3rd of 1 percent of GDP and less than 2 percent of 
federal spending. It follows that the high rates of inflation in the 1970s and 1980s did not occur as a 
result of government finance through debt monetization.  
● The period since 2008 is unlike any other in the Federal Reserve’s history, not only because of 
the unprecedented levels of debt monetization, but also because U.S. Treasury debt has been joined 
with GSE debt as another conduit for debt monetization. As this most recent period continues, it 
remains to be seen whether the Federal Reserve can prevent the inflation implied and so far delayed.  
In sum, since creation of the Federal Reserve, the United States has experienced substantial inflation 
both with and (more commonly) without debt monetization. It remains to be seen if the United States 
can experience substantial debt monetization without inflation. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Abel and Bernanke (2005, p. 591). 
Note 2. Sargent (2012, p. 28). 
Note 3. For a detailed description of Federal Reserve operating procedures, see Akhtar (1997) and 
Fabozzi (2012). 
Note 4. The sources for all of the data used in this paper are described in detail in Appendix B. Annual 
figures for all Federal Reserve data are on a fiscal-year basis. GDP and the GDP deflator are on a 
calendar-year basis. 
Note 5. See Friedman (1971), Sargent and Wallace (1981), Dornbusch and Fisher (1993), and Abel and 
Bernanke (2005, chapters 14 and 15). 
Note 6. The basic quantity-theory identity is employed only to illustrate the simplest version of the 
relationship, not to suggest that velocity is stable or that the function is time-invariant. I am aware of no 
attempt to estimate an empirical relationship between inflation and debt-monetization for the U.S. The 
results here do not suggest that such an effort would be productive. Though see Catão and Terrones 
(2005) on the relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation. 
Note 7. While the previous section looks at the entire history of the Federal Reserve, this section looks 
at inflation since 1940. Wide swings in the GDP deflator, both positive and negative, that occurred 
before 1940 are clearly unrelated to debt monetization. See Friedman and Schwartz (1963, chapters 
5-9). Inflation is measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of successive values of the GDP 
deflator. 
Note 8. Debt monetization as defined here is equivalent to the textbook definition of net open-market 
operations, which are widely understood to be a primary tool of the monetary authorities. Given that 
inflation in the U.S. bears no relationship to debt monetization, at least since 1952, open-market 
operations by themselves do not seem to play a meaningful role in how the Federal Reserve controls 
inflation. How the Federal Reserve does control inflation is not further addressed here. Sargent (1999) 
provides a comprehensive treatment of that topic. See also Kishor and Kochin (2007), Sargent and 
Surico (2011), Sargent (2012), and Ihrig et al. (2015). 
Note 9. The values for the private debt held by the Federal Reserve since 2007 are shown in Appendix 
A. Most of the private debt purchased during the financial crisis would be sold by the end of 2012. 
Private debt would seem to play a different role in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. Even though 
substantial profits or losses may occur on the Federal Reserve’s purchases of private debt, there is no 
presumption that these private obligations would be forgiven or rolled over indefinitely. See 
Williamson (2015) for a concise overview of Federal Reserve policy since the financial crisis. 
Note 10. See Flannery and Frame (2006) for a succinct discussion of the various GSEs. As with 
Treasury securities, GSE securities are shown at face value. 
Note 11. See Fabozzi (2012, Chapter 10) and Passmore (2005) for discussions of the federal guarantee 
of GSE securities. Given the bankruptcy and federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, their 
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agency securities would be worthless without the federal guarantee. The mortgage backed securities, on 
the other hand, might retain substantial value even without any federal guarantee, to the extent that they 
are serviced by the underlying mortgages. 
Note 12. See Thornton (2010), Andolfatto and Li (2013), Plosser (2014), Ihrig et al. (2015). 
Note 13. For details see Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2013). 
 
Appendix A 
Federal Reserve Holdings of Private Debt 
Table 4 shows Federal Reserve holdings of private debt over the period 2007 through 2015. 
 
Table 4. Federal Reserve Holdings of Private Debt in $ Billions, 2007-2015 
End of Fiscal 
Year 
All Liquidity 
Facilities 
Support for Specific 
Institutions 
Total Private 
Debt 
Change in Total 
Private Debt 
2007 $0.2 $0.0 $0.2 - 
2008 $509.7 $74.0 $583.6 $583.4 
2009 $347.8 $100.3 $448.1 -$135.6 
2010 $30.9 $112.0 $143.0 -$305.1 
2011 $12.0 $46.7 $58.6 -$84.3 
2012 $16.4 $1.8 $18.2 -$40.4 
2013 $0.5 $1.6 $2.1 -$16.1 
2014 $0.4 $1.7 $2.0 -$0.1 
2015 $0.9 $1.7 $2.6 $0.6 
 
The Federal Reserve describes these holdings as follows: 
All Liquidity Facilities includes: term auction credit; primary credit; secondary credit; seasonal credit; 
primary dealer credit facility; asset-backed commercial paper money market mutual fund liquidity 
facility; term asset-backed securities loan facility; commercial paper funding facility; and central bank 
liquidity swaps. 
Support to Specific Institutions includes: Maiden Lane LLC; Maiden Lane II LLC; Maiden Lane III 
LLC; and support to AIG. 
The “Maiden Lane” entities were established to acquire and service AIG and Bear Sterns debt. 
 
Appendix B 
Data Sources 
– Federal Reserve holdings of Treasury securities from 1940 are from the Office of Management 
and Budget (http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historicals), Table 7.1. Data before 1940 are from 
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the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1942, Table 99.C. 
– GDP values from 1929 are from the Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp). GDP values from 1914 to 1928 are from “Measuring 
Worth” (http://www.measuringworth.com).  
– GDP deflator values from 1929 forward are from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp). GDP deflator values from 1914 to 
1928 are from “Measuring Worth” (http://www.measuringworth.com). 
– Federal Reserve holdings of all Treasury and GSE securities for the period since 2008 are from 
the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H41: Factors Affecting Reserve Balances 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/hist/h41hist3.htm). 
– Federal Reserve holdings of all private debt for the period since 2007 are from the Federal 
Reserve (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm), under “Selected Assets 
of the Federal Reserve”. 
– Excess reserves and Treasury bill rates are from the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED data base. 
